Abstract-By intruding on the substations and control center of the supervisory control and data acquisition system, trip commands can be sent to intelligent electronic devices that control the power system breakers. Reliability of the power system can be impacted through the cyberattacks. In this paper, a modified semi-Markov process (SMP) model is used to describe the procedures of normal and penetration attacks against the intrusion tolerant system. By modeling the transition probabilities between the SMP states and sojourn time of each SMP state, the mean times to compromise the normal and penetration attacks are calculated. With increased probabilities of breaker trips resulted from the cyberattacks, the loss of load probabilities are evaluated based on IEEE reliability test system 79. When the level of attack increases or the level of defense in the system decreases, the simulation results demonstrate that the power system becomes less reliable.
I. INTRODUCTION

W
ITH THE more open standard-based communication network, the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system of the power grid has become the target of the cyberattacks [1] . Acknowledged by a number of cities, critical infrastructures, and the industrial control systems are targeted by the sophisticated cyberattacks [2] . Besides the normal cyberattacks which intrude into the human machine interface of the substation, advanced persistent threats (APTs) may bring the SCADA system more severe impacts [3] . In the APT attacks, the attackers use the unreleased vulnerability exploits and social engineering techniques or malwares. These techniques make the APT attacks more difficult to be detected. Also, by using a slow and penetrating approach, the targeted system will be maintained in a long-term control and data collection state [4] . Both normal and APT attacks bring potential threats to the power grid, thus, the occurrence and the impacts of the cyberattacks on the power grid need to be evaluated quantitatively.
Enhancement of the cybersecurity in the SCADA network is a challenging task. Significant studies have been performed on the intrusion tolerant systems (ITSs) in a qualitative manner. An adaptive hierarchy ITS is modeled in [5] , which implements the autonomic learning and adaptive function of the confidence threshold. By computing the value of the confidence threshold, the self-recovery and self-optimization of the target network are improved. In [6] , a model-based validation is considered in the networked intrusion-tolerant information system. With different classifications of the attackers, the survivability of the system is evaluated, and the probability of successful transactions between the clients and core is calculated. In [7] , a stochastic model is proposed to validate an intrusion tolerant replication management system using a quantitative approach. With various measurements and parameter adjustments on the probabilistic model, different network management schemes are decided. The ITSs are also installed in the SCADA system. In [8] , a survivable SCADA system is architected and evaluated. The modern intrusion-tolerant protocols are integrated with a conventional SCADA system. This survivable SCADA system is able to offer the desired functions while defending the cyberattacks. Reference [9] provides an intrusion tolerant security system for the critical components in the SCADA system. The intrusion tolerant security system is composed of several modules. Various intrusion tolerance techniques are implemented and the SCADA system is more resilient and survivable to attacks. In [10] , the Byzantine fault tolerance technology is applied in the SCADA local area network, and high degree of reliability and security of the power grid monitoring and control are ensured.
Much research have been exploited on the estimation of the frequency of the cyberattacks, which may occur on the communication networks such as the SCADA system. In [11] , a unified quantitative framework is modeled, and the mean time to compromise (MTTC) is measured by considering both known and zero day attacks. This framework entails a general approach which can be used in the communication network of the power system. A model for estimating the MTTC on the component of the system is generated in [12] , which provides an estimation of the intrusion time intervals of exploiting the known vulnerabilities and the attack skills. By applying this model to a CS60 SCADA system, it is found that a successful attack may occur in three days by the expert attacks. Reference [13] adds the visibility parameter of attackers, which is tested with the state-space model for the attack paths estimation.
Different metrics are proposed to quantify the impact of cyberattacks on the SCADA system. In [14] , a quantitative risk reduction estimation metric is evaluated in CS60 SCADA control system. The risk brought by the cyberattacks is assessed by evaluating the MTTCs of the target components of the SCADA system, and the risk is reduced by patching the components and decreasing the amount of vulnerabilities. Reference [15] proposes an attack tree model and describes potential cyberattack scenarios by combining attack leaves, and the impacts of vulnerabilities in the SCADA system is evaluated based on the attack tree graph.
Power system reliability may be impacted by the malfunction of the associated monitoring and control system. In [16] , a new methodology is proposed which considers the widearea measurement system (WAMS) as a monitoring/control infrastructure in the power system. The power system operation is enhanced with the monitoring and control activities of the WAMS. For instance, the WAMS can help to prevent the spread of accidents in the power system. This methodology is evaluated on the 9-bus and IEEE 57-bus systems. In [17] , an analytical framework for the optimal placement of the phasor measurement unit (PMU) is proposed. Although a more secure and reliable service is provided as the number of the PMUs increases in the WAMS, the related cost has restricted the number of the PMUs in the power system. Based on the cost/benefit analysis, the optimal number and the locations of the PMUs are calculated.
In this paper, the penetration attack, which is one of APT attacks, is compared with the normal attack on the SCADA system. The semi-Markov process (SMP) model [18] of the ITS is modified and utilized in the SCADA network to describe the interactions between the cyberattack and defense on the power system. With the optimal allocation of the resources of the attackers and defenders, the transition probabilities of the SMP models are calculated based on the probabilistic model of the successful attack [19] . The sojourn time of each state is modeled by considering different levels of attack and defense [12] , [13] . MTTCs of successful attacks against various cybernetworks are evaluated with the transition probability and sojourn time in each state. With a forensic mean time to recovery (MTTR) of the intruded cybercomponent, probabilities of normal, and penetration attacks on the substations and control center can be calculated. System breakers are forced to trip when unauthorized commands are sent through the successful cyberattack, and this will increase the outage frequencies of the physical components. This effect is represented by the increased probability of successful cyberattacks, and Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) is used to estimate its impact on the overall power system reliability.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the interactions of the power system outage factors and their impacts on the power system are discussed. In Section III, an SMP model of the ITS is described.
This model describes the intrusion process of the cyberattacks on the SCADA system as well as the related intrusion tolerance mechanisms. With the transition probability between the two states and sojourn time of each state in the SMP model, the MTTC of the normal and penetration attacks are modeled. In Section IV, MTTCs of the normal and penetration attacks are calculated at various attack and defense levels, and probabilities of successful cyberattacks based on the MTTCs are then estimated. And the loss of load probability (LOLP) values for IEEE reliability test system 79 (RTS79) [20] are estimated based on the updated available intervals of physical components. The conclusion is presented in Section V.
II. POWER SYSTEM OUTAGE FACTORS
When a fault occurs in the power system, some associated components may become malfunctioning or even failed. And consequently more failures in the related physical or cyberinfrastructure could be caused. These failures may collectively lead to more significant impacts on the power system. Various factors or uncertainties (e.g., cyber or physical contingencies, and human errors) may not only affect the power system individually, but could interact with each other to result in more complex and dominant failure modes. The power system outage factors and the impacts brought by their interactions are discussed in the following.
When faults occur in the physical infrastructure, the cyberinfrastructure could be affected. And these combined failures in the physical and cyberinfrastructures may cause further power system performance degradation [21] . For instance, if the power supply of some critical components in the monitoring and control system (e.g., the substation controller) is interrupted due to a physical failure, the power system operator may have difficulty to make timely, informed decisions for managing the power system. If no effective actions are taken in time, the system might collapse in the worst case scenarios.
Hidden failures in the protection system may trigger undesired operations or behaviors of the electrical components, which may thus degrade the power system performance as well. During normal system operations the hidden failures are usually not detectable, and they are made manifest only when certain incidents take place in the power system or they are demanded to execute the originally intended functions. With hidden failures, critical components may be disconnected from the power system or the protection system may fail to respond the protection signal in a timely manner [22] . This type of undesired tripping or misoperations due to the malfunctioning protection system will directly affect the power system operations. A related example is the London outage in 2003, where the protection equipment misjudged the change of power flows to be a fault, which led to the loss of load of 724 MW [23] .
Cyberfailures may degrade the physical current-carrying system performance due to the high interdependency between the cyber and physical portions of the contemparory power grid [21] . The failures in the cyberinfrastructure, such as the alarm system failures, may prevent the system operator from becoming aware of the abnormal conditions of physical components, thus, no informed decision could be made to take corrective actions in a timely manner. One related example is the northeastern North America outage in 2003. This outage affected approximately 50 million people in eight states of the U.S. and two provinces in Canada-about 63 GW of the load in that region were interrupted. The key factors contributing to the propogation of failures in the power outage were the malfunction of state estimators and the lack of alarm failure detection systems [24] .
Inaccurate or wrong control signals and system state information could be generated by the malfunctioning electronic components. The incorrect information may mislead the system operators to make uninformed or totally wrong decisions which will then decrease the performance of the power system or even cripple the entire system [21] . The incorrect control or actuation signal received may directly trip a properly working electrical component. For instance, inaccurate control signals may delay the execution of system protection scheme or trigger the wrong protection action at a wrong moment [24] . Also, misoperations of the physical components caused by the cybermalfunctions may increase the stress of system operators so that human errors are more likely to happen. Human errors of the operator may worsen situations by causing further undesired outcomes [25] .
Severe power outages may also be caused by inadequate information sharing among the power networks [24] . Since an electrical failure may affect its own power network as well as its adjacent networks, system operators should be aware of the statuses of their own power systems as well as the neighboring systems. When the real-time information on system statuses is not adequately shared in a timely fashion, coordinated actions to mitigate the undesired conditions may not be successfully implemented. One or more power networks may thus become vulnerable, which could cause disturbances to the neighboring networks. One such related example is the Italy outage in 2003. The lack of adequate communication and coordination among system operators resulted in the delayed corrective actions, and as a result the load of the whole country was disconnected [24] .
Due to the wider deployment of information and communication technologies, the power system infrastructure is exposed to more potential cyberthreats. The cyberattackers may gain access to the critical monitoring, control and protection components or systems in the cyberinfrastructure through cyberintrusions [24] . Then they may directly send fabricated operation commands to electrical devices, or send fabricated measurements to mislead the system operator. These activities could eventually impact the operations and security of the power system [21] . The focus of this paper is placed on modeling and analyzing the impact of cyberattacks on power systems quantitatively.
III. CYBERATTACK MODEL IN POWER SYSTEM
A. Preliminary of the Semi-Markov Processes
SMPs combine a large family of stochastic processes. In these processes, the particular cases are the continuous time Markov chains (CTMCs), discrete time Markov chains (DTMCs), as well as ordinary, modified, and alternating renewal processes. Similar to the Markov process, the transition rate of the SMP is only relevant to the current state, which means the state transitions are memoryless. However, since the transition rates to other states may alter over the state duration, the distribution of the interarrival times between subsequent states is not exponential. Therefore, the extensions are an arbitrary duration distribution and nonstationary transition rates compared with the CTMC [26] .
An SMP is constructed from a pair of processes Z = (X, T), where X is a Markov chain with the state space S and the transition probability matrix P ij (t). And T is a process that T(n) only depends on X(n − 1) and X(n). The definition of the SMP is described below in details.
Assume E = {1, . . . , N} is a set of states in a system and the probability space with the probability function P, and a bivariate time-homogeneous Markov chain is defined, which is (X, T) = {(X n , T n ); n ∈ N = {0, 1, 2, . . .}}. X n takes values from E, and T n is the parameter on the half-real line R + = [0, ∞), and the constraint is 0
is a Markov renewal process (MRP), which has the transition function with the semi-Markov kernel
In function (X, T), the component X is a Markov chain with the transition function p(i, j) = Q ij (+∞). Also, it is assumed that T n = U 1 + · · · + U n is the time of the nth renewal with N 1 = sup{n : T n ≤ t}, which is a counter process of the number of the renewal between 0 and t.
It is defined that the SMP Z = {Z t ; t ∈ R + }, along with the MRP described above, has Z t = X n and X n = Z T n . The transition probability is defined as P ij (t) = P{Z t = j|Z 0 = i}, where j ∈ E is the system occupied state at time t ≥ 0, and the system starts from state i at time t = 0. The transition probabilities are represented by the renewal equation
where
The transition probabilities can also be illustrated as
where P(.) = P ij (.) is a square matrix function and h(.) = diag(h i (.)) is a diagonal matrix function [27] . The SMP is similar to the Markov process. Both processes are represented by a set of states, and the state transitions are controlled by the transition probability matrix. SMPs are extensions of the Markov processes. SMP differs from the Markov process in that the intervals between state transitions may be random variables. Also, the time spent in any state may be a probability density function of the state of occupancy, as well as the occurrence of the state transition [28] . The renewal theory is used to formulate SMPs, since the interarrival times between various events are not necessary to be distributed exponentially. An SMP is a stochastic process which reflects the states of the MRP. A continuous-time stochastic process is found as an SMP or MRP when its embedded jump chain is a Markov chain, and its holding times are random variable with any distribution. The embedded jump chain is the discrete process which records the values taken by the process. The holding times are the time intervals of two jumps [28] .
Similar to other stochastic processes, SMPs model the behaviors or systems in a wide range of computing and engineering problems. The main advantage of the SMP is the availability of the nonexponential distributions for the transitions between states. Another advantage is that the SMP is able to generalize different types of stochastic processes [29] . And the SMP model is able to specialize on the cyberattacks modeling [18] . In this paper, since the intrusion time in the attack cases is nonexponential, the SMP model is considered to solve the problem of the attack on the ITS. Also, the SMP model can be used to identify the absorbing state, which is able to measure the mean time to failure of the states [18] . This SMP model is applied to estimate the MTTC of the cyberattacks in this paper. Fig. 1 illustrates the state transition diagram of the ITS in the SCADA network. It represents a framework of the dynamic behaviors in ITS, which is modified from the state transition model of the ITS in [16] . This model generally describes various intrusion processes of the normal and penetration attacks, and multiple intrusion tolerance strategies are included in the model, and tolerance of attacks with different impacts is provided by this model.
B. State Transition Diagram and the SMP Models
Two types of cyberattacks are assumed to occur in the SCADA system, which are the normal attack and the penetration attack. Processes of these attacks and the intrusion tolerance to the attacks are represented by two SMP models. These two SMP models are sub-diagrams of the state transition diagram in Fig. 1 . The first SMP model illustrates the normal attack on the ITS in Fig. 2 . It is assumed that the normal attack is initiated on the substation network. The automation stages are still less advanced in current transmission and distribution substations [30] , and the architecture of the substation network is less complicated. Also, control commands on one substation LAN are limited to its field devices, and these commands may not detrimentally impact the system as a whole [30] . Thus, it is assumed that the substation-level attack is the normal cyberattack and less complicated.
When an ITS is installed in the SCADA system, the security and the robustness of the SCADA system are increased. Cyberdefense strategies or countermeasures such as access control, information encryption, and firewall enhancement are able to resist the attacks against the SCADA system, which control the operations of the power system. When the strategy of detection fails, or new vulnerabilities are found by attackers, the state of the system transits from the good state G to vulnerable state V, which implies the system is no longer in a secure environment. Rather, unauthorized access to the system is available to the attackers. The intrusion states (V to A) will become state G when the attack processes are detected and isolated. As one or several vulnerabilities of one server are successfully exploited, the attacker is able to acquire the privilege of the targeted server, and the host state H will be reached. When the attack is a normal attack, the attacker only needs to control one server, and he can launch the attack to the destination device from the controlled server. When the attacker has successfully launched the attack on the destination device, the state has transferred to attack state A, which means the SCADA system is being attacked. And the intrusion tolerant mechanism is triggered simultaneously when the abnormal status of the system is detected. When the attacker proceeds from the good state G to the attack state A, the intrusion detection system (IDS) or other detection mechanisms keep on searching the detectable intrusion. And the state will transit to the good state G when the IDSs successfully detect the attack attempts.
If the network is given enough redundancy, the state will transfer to masked compromised state MC from A, which means the system is still able to provide normal service when the system is compromised. While the attack cannot be detected by the intrusion tolerance strategies, the state undetected compromise state UC will occur. If the active attack is detected while exploiting the network, the system will enter the triage state TR. In this state, various approaches of defense are considered to respond to the attack so that the least loss may be caused. Based on the classification of attacks, the states following the TR are divided as graceful degradation state GD, the failed secure state FS, and the failed state F. When the availability of the network is impacted by the attack, which is found by the ITS, the state will be transferred to GD. When the impact on the integrity or confidentiality of the network is found, state FS will be reached from state TR. If the type of attacks is not found and no protection strategy is generated, the state enters failed state F and the cyberattack such as sending trip signals has been successfully completed.
In the other scenario, the attacker may launch the penetration attacks. These attacks may occur on the control center which is able to send control commands to the substations. The SMP model of the penetration attack is illustrated in Fig. 3 . Compared with the substation network, the control center network adopts more complicated defense strategies, which makes a successful attack more difficult and demands more advanced intrusion technologies. Also, severe impacts on the power system may be caused if the control center is successfully penetrated and embedded with the backdoor. When zero-day vulnerabilities are exploited, the penetration attack may occur several times on the control center network [31] . Compared with the normal attack, more efforts (time) are needed for a successful penetration attack. The whole network should be controlled before the penetration attack is launched, thus, the attacker should acquire the privileges of the servers in the whole network. In order to achieve this goal, efforts should be placed on connection of the servers from the attacker. And the state is transferred to connection state C, which indicates the whole network is connected by the attacker. The state then transits to network state N, showing the privileges of the connected servers are obtained by the attacker. In the state N, the attacker may embed backdoors in the servers, which enables In order to analyze the impacts brought by normal and penetration attacks on the ITS, the actions of the attacker and the response of the system should be quantitatively modeled and evaluated. The attacker is to send the ITS to the failed state, which requires the attacker to spend time or effort on the intrusion. In general, the efforts of the attackers are represented by the average time of the attack, and the time can be considered as a random variable, which satisfies the nonexponential distributions based on the nature of the attack [18] . Since the attacker may not be successful all the times when it approaches to the failed state F, the probability of the successful state transition caused by the attack is always not more than 1. From the state transition processes of the SMP models shown in Figs. 2 and 3 , the actions of the attacker are states {G, V, H, A} in the normal attack, and states {G, V, H, C, N, A}.
Similar to the attackers, the defenders of the ITS also invest on the SCADA system. If enough defense resources are invested on the ITS, the security level of the SCADA system is constantly monitored and evaluated. When the attack is detected, remedial actions will be initiated and the system will move back to the secure state. Similar to the impact of the attacker, the effect of the defense depends on the resource invested on the ITS. The effort of the defenders can also be modeled as the random variable, which is represented as the probability distribution function. Also, it is not realistic to assume that the ITS is able to detect all attacks, thus, the probability of the detection of the attack is not larger than 1. In both SMP models, the response of the ITS to the attack are states {MC, UC, TR, FS, GD, F} and the transitions between these states.
It is assumed that the response to the attack is automatic and is similar to the respond to the accidental faults of the SCADA system. Let {S(t) : t ≥ 0} be the underlying stochastic process. When the attack is the normal attack, the process is composed of a set of the discrete space S n = {G, V, H, A, TR, MC, UC, FS, GD, F}; and when the attack is the penetration attack, the space of the stochastic process is S p = {G, V, H, C, N, A, TR, MC, UC, FS, GD, F}. Two types of parameters are needed when the SMP model is quantified. The first one is the state transition probability p ij between different states i ∈ S n (S p ) and j ∈ S n (S p ), which indicates the probability that the attacker successfully transits to the state i. Another parameter is the mean sojourn time T i of each state i ∈ S n (S p ), which indicates the mean time consumed on the state by the attacker. The transition probabilities and the mean sojourn time intervals in the SMP models are summarized in Table I .
The probability matrix P n represents transition probability matrix in the SMP model of the normal attack, which is expressed as 
where p i represents 1 − p i , also, p mu and p fg are 1 − p mc − p uc and 1 − p fs − p gd , respectively. And the probability matrix P p represents transition probability matrix in the SMP model of the penetration attack 
G V H C N A MC UC TR FS GD F
P p = G V H C N A MC UC TR FS GD F ⎡ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎣ ( p v ) p⎤ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎦ .(5)
C. MTTC Model of the Cyberattacks on the SCADA System
In order to evaluate the impacts of the reliability on the power system caused by cyberattacks in the SCADA network, one critical issue is the frequency of the successful cyberattacks in the SCADA network. Thus, the measurement of the MTTC in the SMP model of the ITS in the SCADA network is needed for the reliability evaluation. In the SMP model, the MTTC estimates the mean time that the states of the system become the failed or security-compromised states, which are considered as the absorbing states [18] . In both SMP models of the normal and penetration attacks, the set of absorbing states is represented as S a = {UC, FS, GD, F}. The set of transient states of the normal attack is S tn = {G, V, H, A, MC, TR}, while S tp = {G, V, H, C, N, A, MC, TR} represents the transient states of the penetration attack. The transition probability matrices P n and P p in the SMP models combine the submatrices Q n and Q p . Q n consists of the transition probabilities of the transient state set S tn , and Q p represents the transition probability matrix of the transient state set S tp 
G V H A MC TR
Q n = G V H A MC TR ⎡ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎣ ( p v ) p v 0 0 0 0 ( p h ) 0 p h 0 0 0 ( p a ) 0 0 p a 0 0 0 0 0 0 p mc ( p mu ) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ⎤ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎦(6)
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The MTTC of the successful normal or penetration attack is represented as
where T i is the mean sojourn time in state i, and V i indicates the average number of times that state i is visited before the absorbing states are reached [18] . The visit count element V i is
where q i is the probability that the DTMC starts at state i [18] . Since the good state G is always assumed as the initial state, q G is 1 and other q i are 0, and q ij is the element in matrix Q n or Q p . By substituting elements in the matrix Q n , visit count elements V i of cyberattacks on the substation are
Also, V i of cyberattacks on the control center is depicted with elements in Q p
By altering values of the transition probabilities q ji in matrices Q n and Q p and the mean sojourn times T i , the MTTC of successful normal and penetration attacks are calculated. With different levels of attackers and defenders' strength, the transition probabilities q ji are impacted by offensive and defensive resources allocated to the targets, which are 24 substations and the control center. Also, based on the intrusion statistics of the normal and penetration attacks, values of the mean sojourn times T i of the transient states are constants.
D. Model of the Transition Probability of the Transient States
In order to calculate the MTTC of the SCADA system, the transition probabilities of the transient states should be modeled. Since the successful transitions in the transient states (i.e., S tn and S tp ) are impacted by the competition between the attacker and defender, the arms race of the attacker and defender should be considered in the model of the transition probability. In this paper, a success probability function [19] is applied to represent the relations of the attacker and defender.
The target of the attackers and defenders is the SCADA systems, which are installed in the network of the substations and control center. It is assumed there are N targets indexed by i, and there are 24 substations and 1 control center which controls the substations, thus, N is 25. The attacker has the total budget BA as the attack resource, and the defender possesses the total budget BD for defending the attacks on the SCADA system. When the attackers and defenders have allocated BA and BD to N targets, probability of the successful attack on each target i can be calculated, the success probabilities indicate the transition probabilities of the transient states S tn and S tp .
It is assumed that the vulnerability is the probability of the destruction of the target asset, and the vulnerability increased by the attacker is represented as
where A i is the attack resource allocated to the target i by the attackers, which is the budget or investment on the attack.
AC i is the least investment of the attackers to increase the vulnerability of the targets. Similarly, the probability of the successful attack can be indicated by the vulnerability of the defender. The vulnerability decreased by the defender on one asset i is modeled as
where D i is the least defense resource allocated to the targeted asset i, which represents the budget provided to the defender.
is the defender elimination cost to reduce the vulnerability, and DF i is the defender elimination fraction for the targeted asset i, which means the percentage of the availability for the elimination cost DC i . With the vulnerabilities of the attacker and defender to the asset i, the joint probability of the successful attack on the target is
The probability of the successful attack p i (A i , D i ) is combined with the consequence on the targets to formulate the total risk of the targets
where d i is the consequences on the target i when it is successfully attacked, which means the expected damage or the economic loss on the target. It indicates the intrinsic value of the target. N is the total amount of the targets for the attackers. The risk of the target network R(A i , D i ) is influenced by the defender and attacker vulnerabilities and the damage on each target. The risk can be reduced by increasing the resource of the defender D i , and the risk is increased by increasing the resource of the attacker A i . This indicates the formulation of R is a two-party game between the competitors, thus, the problem is become the optimal resource allocation by defenders and attackers. The objective of the defender is to minimize the total risk whereas the attacker plans to maximize the total risk.
The objective function is expressed as
Subject to
In order to find the optimal allocation of the resources, two Lagrange multipliers λ 1 and λ 2 are applied, the objective function is altered as [19] 
By differentiating with respect to D i for the optimal resource of the defender, the total risk by the defender is minimized. The optimal defender resource D i (A i ) allocated on target i is represented as
Similarly, the attacker resource A i is differentiated and the optimal resource of attacker By differentiating (A i , D i ) with two Lagrange multipliers, the optimal representations of λ 1 and λ 2 are
The total risk of the targets can be updated by substituting (19) and (20) into (13) . The resources of the attacker and defender are substituted as the optimal allocations A i (D i ) and D i (A i ). It can be found that the solution of the optimal D i requires A i , and the optimal A i requires D i . The arms race will be iterated until the risk of the whole network reaches a fixed point.
The process of the fixed risk point optimization between the attacker and defender is described below with the pseudocode in Fig. 4 [19] .
By substituting the attack resource A i and the defense resource D i by the optimal allocated resource A i (D i ) and (12), the success probabilities on the target asset are calculated. The success probability p i (A i , D i ) represents the transition probability of the transient state q ji , which is impacted by different budgets of the attack and defense.
E. Mean Sojourn Time Estimation
The mean sojourn time T i is the average time consumed by the attacker on the transient state i. In the MTTC estimation, only transient states S n and S p are needed. Based on the statistical data, the sojourn time T i of the transient states are specified as positive constants.
T G represents the mean time that the system is in the good state G, which implies that no cyberattack is attempted on the SCADA network. It is found that the attackers may launch various cyberattacks each day from the realistic data [31] , thus, T G is assumed as 1 day. T V implies the mean time that the model is in the vulnerable state, and this interval is considered as the average time between the announcement and exploit of a new vulnerability. For the normal attacks, the average time of releasing the vulnerability is 5.8 days [32] . For the penetration attack on the control center, zero-day vulnerabilities are exploited to ensure the success of the attack. The average time interval to release a zero-day vulnerability is 19 days [31] . Thus, T V of the normal attacks is assumed as 5.8 days and the penetration attack is 19 days. The mean time of gaining the privilege of one component is represented by T H . In state H, the attackers are able to exploit the vulnerabilities and elevate the privilege of the component, thus, T H is assumed as one day for both normal and penetration attacks, which is the average time interval for exploiting the vulnerabilities [12] . In the attack state A, T A is the mean time to launch the attack before it is detected, and it can be represented by the average time between the announcement of a cyberattack and the release of its patches. Based on the data in [31] , T A is about 1.8 days for the normal attacks, and for the penetration attacks, T A is four days. T C and T N should be considered before state A is reached in the penetration attacks. T C is assumed as the average time interval that the attacker keeps on waiting for a victim to work on the other components. The duration is assumed to be two days, which is substituted by the average time of the network maintenance [33] . T N is the time interval that the whole network is controlled by the attacker after one component is controlled. Since when both exploits and vulnerabilities are available to the attacker, the average time to exploit vulnerabilities is one day. The time of the exploit is used to represent the control of the whole network, thus, T N is one day [12] . T MC indicates the mean time that the network is given enough redundancy even though a successful attack is launched on the target. T TR represents the average time that the mitigation strategy is estimated by the ITS. Since both T MC and T TR are the reaction time intervals of the ITS and will not last long, these mean time periods are assumed as the normalized values: T MC is one day and T TR is 0.5 day.
F. Reliability Evaluation
When the attack is the normal attack, it is assumed that the attacker has successfully intruded into the target server of a substation, which is usually controlled by one server. And it is assumed that the penetration attack occurs in the control center, which is composed of a large number of servers. Attackers may send trip commands to intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) installed in the substations, and severe impacts such as unauthorized generator trips may be resulted in. Also, considering the random behavior of the intruder and the recovery actions of the fault tolerant system, the stochastic consequence may be caused by either normal or penetration attacks. The stochastic impact can be represented by trips of random number of breakers in the targeted substations. This is reasonable because of the random control feature of the acquisition units (DAUs) in the substation LANs [34] . The DAUs are used to collect data of the voltage transformers, current transformers, and the status information of the substations. These transformers can be controlled by various breakers. One IED is allocated to acquire data from several DAUs. Meanwhile, one DAU is able to receive protection commands from multiple IEDs, which enable the protection devices to open and close. It can be found that the breakers of the substation can be randomly tripped when the fault command is sent to IEDs by the attackers. Thus, the breaker trips are assumed to be random in the face of normal or penetration attacks.
When the network resides in the failure state, the trip commands have been sent to the breakers, and the corresponding physical components will be in the repair state. The repair time after a successful cyberattack includes the cyberforensics time as well as the physical restoration duration [20] . And the mean time to repair is denoted by MTTR. In this paper, the forensics recovery time is assumed as one day in both normal and penetration attack scenarios. When the attacker has launched the normal attack, the probability of a cyberattack is
When the attacker is the penetration attack, the probability of the cyberattack is
where α is the times of attack occurrence when the first penetration attack is successful. TrAtt is the time needed by the attackers when the Trojan horse or backdoor is embedded in the servers of the control center. By using the backdoor technology, the attacker is able to reach state A from state G directly. In this paper, α is set as 10, which implies the control center is assumed to be attacked ten times within a year. The reliability evaluation is conducted based on MCS by considering both physical failures and cyberattacks. The procedure for reliability evaluation is illustrated in Fig. 5 and is described as follows.
1) Model the reliability of physical components, which are composed of the generators, transmission lines, and loads. The time interval of the simulation is set as 1 h in this paper. The reliability of the generators is modeled by MTTC and MTTR. The reliability of the transmission lines is usually modeled by the outage rate and duration hours. 2) Model the MTTCs based on the attack types, the target network in the SCADA system, the levels of attack and defense, etc. And because of very limited data available, without loss of generality, the MTTR after a successful cyberattack is assumed to be one day in this paper. 3) Randomly choose a physical system state based on the MCS. 4) Check whether a successful cyberattack occurs. In this step, a random number within [0, 1] is generated and it is compared with p normal or p penetration in different attack scenarios. If the random number is larger than the parameter, it means the cyberattack is unsuccessful, go to step 6; otherwise, go to the next step. 5) Update the statuses of the physical components which are affected by cyberattacks. For instance, when one generator is successfully tripped, its status will become from up to down. 6) Perform the optimal power flow (OPF) analysis to evaluate the physical system state [35] . In this paper, DC OPF analysis is adopted which is shown below. The DC OPF is described in (5)- (10) min
PF S j ≤ PF max (28) where PG is the generation vector; PC is the load curtailment vector; PD is the load demand vector; N B is the set of load demands; N G is the set of generations; A(S j ) is the matrix to show the relationship between the line power flow and load/generation under condition S j ; S j incorporates both physical state sampled in step 3) and the influence of cyberattack in step 5); and PF is the line transmission capacity.
7) When the stopping criterion is not satisfied, go to step 3). In this paper, the simulation duration is specified to be 30 years, which turns out to be sufficient for achieving the MCS convergence. 8) Calculate the reliability indices. In this paper, common reliability indices, LOLP and expected energy not supplied, are calculated.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Optimal Resource Allocation and Transition Probabilities of the Transient States
The initial values of the attacker and defender are assumed as shown in Table II . These values are acquired from [36] and used for illustration purpose, and the realistic values may be obtained through statistics. Since the control center is the most critical component, it is assumed that the expected damage d of the control center is 700, and the remaining damages are randomly distributed from 100 to 350 on the 24 substations. Figs. 6-9 illustrate the optimal resource allocation of the attacker and defender in the control center and 24 substations. With the constraints of the attacker and defender elimination costs AC i and DC i , the total budgets of the attack resource BA and budgets of the defense resource DA are available from 1000 to 9000.
When the budget of the attacker is fixed at 2000, Fig. 6 shows the optimal allocation of the offensive resource BA on 25 targets, and Fig. 7 illustrates the optimal allocation of the increasing defensive resources BD. The budgets of the defense increase from 2000 to 6000. It is found that allocations of both offensive and defensive resources are proportional to the expected damage d on each target, and both largest amounts of BA and BD are given to the control center.
Similarly, Figs. 8 and 9 demonstrate the optimal allocations of BA and BD with the fixed BD = 4000. The total budgets of attack resource BA increase from 1000 to 5000, and the increasing step is 500. It is found the control center is given the largest amount of A cc and D cc due to its highest asset resource, and since substations 4, 14, 15, 17, and 24 have the least expected damages, they are allocated to the least attack and defensive resources.
Since the allocated resources are proportional to the expected damages, the probabilities of the successful attack on each target are the same when values of BA and BD are fixed. The probability of the successful attack on targets p i (A i , D i ) is the transition probability of the transient states. Fig. 10 illustrates the transition probabilities with the increasing resource of defense on the SCADA network. It is found that as the resource of the attacker BA increases, the transition probability increases when the same resource of defense is given. Also, with the fixed resource of attack, the transition probability of the successful attack decreases when the resource of defense increases. Fig. 11 depicts the transition probability curves of successful attack with the increasing resource of attack. It is illustrated that the probability of successful attack is higher when less resource of defense BD is provided. When the resource of the defense is fixed, the probability of the successful attack keeps on increasing when more resources of attack BA are given. It is also found that the increasing rate rarely changes after 4000 attack resource BA is given to the targets when the defense resource BD is fixed. This is realistic since the target of the attacker is specific, while the defenders should provide protection to all targets. The successful probability has reached a high value when limited BA is provided. However, the transition probability monotonically increases with the increasing BA.
B. Transition Probability and MTTC
Figs. 12-15 illustrate the MTTC of the network in the substation or the control center by the normal attack and the penetration attack. As the attack resource BA increases, the time of the attack decreases dramatically. Also, when the resource of defense BD increases, which means the ability of defense decreases, the MTTC of the network also decreases as less effort is needed by the attackers to intrude into the network. It is also found that the value of the intrusion time interval of the penetration attack is larger than the time needed in the normal attack. This is caused by the time consumed by the network connection and control of the whole network.
C. Probability of Cyberattack and LOLP Curves
Figs. 16-19 depict the probability curves of the normal attack p nor and the penetration attack p pene . Five values of attack resource BA and the defense resource BD are assumed, and the curves of p nor and p pene with resource of defense are shown in Figs. 16 and 17 , and the curves of p nor and p pene with increasing resource of attack are illustrated in Figs. 18 and 19 , respectively. It is illustrated that the probabilities of both attacks increase as BA increases and BD decreases. The range of the probabilities of the successful normal attacks is between 1.76×10 −4 and 6.5×10 −3 , and that of the successful penetration attack is between 5.97×10 −5 and 2.48×10 −2 . It is found that p nor is larger than p pene when the resource of attacker is low or the resource of defense is high, which indicates it is less difficult for the novice to launch the normal attacks than penetration attacks. Also, it is found that the system is more Fig. 13 . Distribution of the MTTC curves in the penetration attack. likely to be attacked when the resource of the defense is limited. Moreover, values of p pene are smaller than those of p nor when the resources of attack are limited at 1500. However, the increased ratio of the p pene is larger than p nor , thus, the values of p pene increase to the maximum value at about 2.48 × 10 −2 , while the largest p nor is about 6.5 × 10 −3 . As BA gets larger or BD is less, the penetration attack launched by the higher level attacker is more difficult to be defended than the normal attack. Also, compared with the attackers who possess largest resource, the penetration attack is more difficult to be The range of the LOLP values indicates that the impacts of the penetration attacks on the power system are more severe than the normal cyberattacks. Also, it is illustrated that when the resource of the defense is at least 1.6 times larger than the resource of the attack, the LOLP values are smaller than 0.1. This indicates it is easier to launch the attack than successfully defend the whole SCADA network. And due to the estimation errors of the Monte Carlo method, the increasing trend of the LOLP curve is not as smooth as the probability curves of the attack.
V. CONCLUSION
Two cyberattack scenarios (i.e., the normal and penetration attacks) are considered in this paper. A modified SMP model of the ITS in the SCADA network is utilized to describe the interactions between the cyberattack and defense on the power system. Two cyberattacks, the normal and penetration attacks on the ITS, are modeled by the modified SMP models. By considering the optimal allocation of the attack and defense resources, the transition probabilities of the transient states are modeled based on the probabilistic model of the successful attack. Also, the sojourn time of each state is modeled based on the statistics. MTTCs of successful attacks against cybernetworks of control center and substations are estimated with the transition probability and sojourn time. It is found that as either the level of attack or the visibility of the network increases, less MTTC of the attack is needed. With the increased probabilities of successful cyberattacks, breaker trips of the generators, transmission lines, and loads are also increased. The LOLP values are derived for quantifying the impact of the breaker trips on power system reliability by applying the MCS on IEEE RTS79. It is found that with a high level of attack, the probability of the successful penetration attack is larger compared with the normal attack, and the power system will become less reliable.
In the future research, a more robust ITS will be designed. More cyberattack scenarios in the communication networks of the power system will be researched based on the real cases of cyberattacks. New features in attacks and defenses will be considered, and a more comprehensive probabilistic model of the successful cyberattack will be investigated.
